1. It All Happens in Mind
I
The entire phenomenal universe is an appearance in what is termed 'Mind', and this so-called 'Mind' in which 'we' all mutually appear, which objectively we perceive and cognise as the phenomenal universe, is what we all are - and all that we are.
II
This does not imply that this here-mind, this now-mind is any 'thing' in itself, for quite certainly it is not, and to make an image of it as 'Mind' in mind is merely to make an image of what is making that image - which could only render its apprehension forever inapprehensible.
But if this is understood perhaps the way lies open for cognition, though neither that term nor any other can even suggest what is implied, since every term is relative to its opposite. If there were two factors involved it might be done, but there are no two factors, nor one. Since we are not different or separate from 'mind' we cannot 'prehend' it, nor can we be 'integrated' in it since we have never been disintegrated from it, and as long as we think in relative terms we can never understand what it is.
Nor can we know it by any means, for we are it, and our conceptual extension in what we call 'space' and 'time' gives us this illusion of duality whereby we are prevented not just from knowing what we are but rather from being it without having the absurd illusion that we could be anything else. We cannot 'insee' it either, for there is no thing to insee or to outsee, no where to see in or out of, nor any one to do either.
What, then, is there to be done? When we are what we are do we need to be told what it is, to have it named or described? And could we understand it if it were? If there were only one man in the world - would he know he was a 'man'? Would he be interested to know it? Does light know that it is 'light'?
Is not that perhaps what the Masters meant by their obscure answer to the question of curious disciples enquiring how they knew when they were 'enlightened'? They used an odd formula: they replied 'When you drink water do you know whether it is warm or cold?' It was no answer, however varied or translated. But then the question was no question - and so could have no answer.
For split-mind cannot know mind that is whole.
All is this mind that we are.
If we could know this
What more could there be to be known?* * *
2. Why Sentience is the Gateway to Integrity
What is termed 'bodhi' is the noumenal source of both 'hearing' and 'heard', of phenomenal sound and the hearing of sound, of the auditory object and of the subjective means of its being sensorially perceived.
The hearing-mind, like the seeing-mind, feeling-mind, knowing-mind, every apparently different aspect of sensorial mind is 'bodhi'. As such, all aspects of mind are subjective.
'Sound' is the hearing of sound. 'Hearing' is the source of hearing. All sensorial perceiving is an expression of our nature as 'bodhi'.
The reception of all sense-perceptions is passive, but their source is active. Phenomenally objective, noumenally they are subjective - and their nature is called 'bodhi'.
But the nature of all objects is their subjectivity, since as objects they are only appearance, much as the only nature of shadows is their substance.
The subjective nature of all sense-perceptions, therefore, is 'bodhi', which is our nature as phenomenal 'perceivers'.
As 'bodhi' I am the light that cannot know darkness (or light), the singing that cannot know silence (or sound).
We can say that every imaginable sound may seem to have been made, but no sound has ever been heard.
Why is that? What could there be to make a 'sound'? Who could there be to hear one?
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3. The Hearing Way
I
'Sound' has no meaning apart from the hearing of it, just as knowledge has no meaning apart from the knowing of it.
And the hearing of sound, like the knowing of knowledge, is sensory perception - objectively 'sound' and 'knowledge', subjectively the source of hearing, of knowing, and of all sensory perception, sometimes termed 'bodhi', which inevitably is a name indicating what subjectively we are.
Thus every sound, and all forms of sense-perception, can lead us directly back to our source, as every shadow to its substance, which is the immutable wholeness of mind.
Other than 'mind' there cannot be anything - for what else could there be, since nothing is cognisable otherwise than by mind? Mind alone cognises, and all cognition takes place in mind, yet mind 'itself' is uncognisable since there is nothing to cognise it but mind and 'it' cannot cognise the cognising which is all that it is.
'Mind', therefore, mind that is integral, itself is no 'thing' - for a 'thing' is only that which is cognisable, and mind could never cognise its cognising. The term 'mind' - 'noumenon' or 'noumenality' in more technical language - is no more than an attempted definition of the present participle of the verb 'to be', another of which is 'I'.
The Buddha is recorded as having stated, regarding the six sense-perceptions, that while by their misuse they are the chief hindrance to our recognition of integrality (or whole-mind), they are at the same time our most direct means whereby such recognition of integrality may be recovered. He also stated that whereas all six senses are of equal value in these respects and that the apprehension of what any one of the six is reveals what all are, one - that of hearing - may be more suitable for a given phenomenal individual, such as Ananda, and could be regarded as being more direct. In saying this the Buddha confirmed and explained this same contention which had been so vigorously affirmed by both Avalokiteshvara and Manjusri.
What can be the rational explanation of this apparent anomaly? It can only be suggested that, particularly in bygone times, hearing was more important as a means of developing understanding than was seeing the written word, then relatively rare and available only to the learned. Not only was the spoken word more available but with the aid of metrical quality, by singing and chanting and the sound-manipulation of mantra, objective 'sound' could lead back directly to our 'hearing-nature', which is its subjective aspect, the substance of the shadow, which, like the nature of each other sense-perception, is what is called 'bodhi'. Bodhi, of course, is a term for our 'enlightened' nature or the wholeness of divided and relative mind, which integrality is what we are, and which can only be indicated by the one unobjectifiable word in any language - which is 'I'.
Whether today the auditory 'way' is any more direct or efficacious than the visual, the tactile, gustatory, olfactory, or cognitional 'ways', may be a subject for discussion, also to what extent such efficacity may depend upon the propensity of a given self-constituted individual, but it may doubted whether proficiency in the art associated with each 'way' need necessarily be an indication of the suitability of that sensorial medium rather than an indication that it is not suitable. If a guess should be of any interest to anyone it might be that the disadvantages of experience and addiction might be found to exceed their advantages in this connection.
The efficacy of so-using any one of the senses which, if successful immediately releases the mainmise of all the others, assuredly does not depend upon skill, but chiefly upon understanding. It appears to be necessary that the process itself shall be in-seen and fully apprehended, indeed profoundly understood.
II
'Sound', therefore, is a phenomenal manifestation, an objectivisation in mind - for only in mind can it be cognised as 'sound' - whose subjective element is 'hearing', the hearing aspect of our sensorial-nature whose other aspects are 'seeing', 'feeling', 'knowing', etc. But recognising 'hearing' as our hearing-nature, the returning of 'hearing' to its source, is merely re-objectifiying it as another concept in mind, whereas it is this 'mind' which is responsible for the cognition, not the cognition as such, which is the reintegrating factor whose im-mediate apperception releases all the other aspects of sensory perception. But if 'sound' can carry divided-mind that perceives it objectively directly back to its wholeness, this integrality thereby embraces all six apparently different sensory aspects of the split-mind which so conceives them, and nothing objective in them can remain.
What then obtains? Deprived of sensory objectivisation mind remains integral, and 'otherness' can no longer be perceived as such. Differently expressed, if the apparently personal is seen as 'other', all that was 'other', including that personal 'other', is seen as not-different from the so-seeing 'self'. Why is that? Otherness cannot be other than what is so-seeing, and where there is no 'other' there can be no 'self', where there is no 'self' there can be no 'other', and the absence of both is what I am.
As a result, no phenomena is any longer an apparent objective entity, and all 'things', absolutely all manifestation as such, are nothing but what is cognising.
In this process, inevitably instantaneous, both temporal and spatial extension lose their validity, i.e. they only retain their conceptual appearance in mind, as such, and no longer as objective reality.
This must inevitably be release from conflict, for nothing is any longer other than what it is, what necessarily it must be - since it is not other than its cognising.
So apperceived, all appearance is 'in mind', apart from which nothing can appear, and 'mind' is only a conceptual symbol for what is cognising and as such has no objective quality to be cognised.
* * *
Question: When you are looking at something does the thing looked-at exist objectively within the sphere of perception or not?
Answer: No, it does not.
Hui Hai, p. 48
