The Pseudo-Problem of 'Suffering'

Who is there to suffer?
Only an object could suffer.
I am not an object (no object could be I), and there is no I-object nor I-subject, both of which would then be objects.
Therefore I cannot suffer.

But there appears to be suffering, and its opposite, both pleasure and pain. They are appearances, but they are experienced. By whom, by what, are they experienced?

They are apparently experienced, and by means of an identification of what I am with what I am not, or, if you prefer, by what we are not, illusorily identified with what we are.

What we are does not know pain or pleasure, what we are does not, as such, know anything, for in neither case is there an objective entity to suffer experience.

Whatever intensity sensations may appear to have, in the dream of manifestation they are effects of causes in a time-sequence, and apart from the time-sequence in which they develop they are not either as cause or as effect.

There is no one to suffer. We appear to suffer as a result of our illusory identification with a phenomenal object.
Let us at least understand.
What we are is invulnerable and cannot be bound.

(©HKU Press, 1965)

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